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SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS.
1
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SUPREME COURT OF RIhODE ISLAND.'
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA.$
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN.T
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.
Attorney's Lien-Fraudulent Settlement Out of Cout.-Where,
in an action for divorce and alimony, an order is made by the court
in which the case is pending, requiring a sum of money to be paid
into the court as and for attorney's fees, and afterwards the parties
to the action, by collusion and fraud, and for the purpose of de-
frauding the attorney for plaintiff out of the allowance made for his
compensation, with notice of an attorney's lien thereon in his favor,
enter into an alleged settlement by which the cause is to be dis-
missed, and the order for alimony satisfied, such fraudulent settle-
ment will, on motion of the attorney entitled to the money, be set
aside, and the amount found due ordered to be paid into the court
by the defendant: Aspinwall v. Sabin, 22 or 23 Neb.
BAN.KS AND BA-KING.
N'ational Banks-Penal Actions against-Jurisdiction of State
Courts.-Action and proceedings against any association under the
national banking act may be brought in any state, county, or mu-
nicipal court in the county or city in which such association is lo-
cated, having jurisdiction in similar cases. This applies to a pen-
alty under section 5198 of the United States Revised Statutes:
First National Bank of Teeumseh v. Overman, 22 or 23 Neb.
In such cases the state courts do not exercise a new jurisdiction
conferred upon them, but their ordinary jurisdiction derived from
their construction under the state law: Claflin v. HUousenan, 93 U.
S. 130: Id.
Certificate of Deposit-- Unauthorized Payment to Agent.-Peyser,
a collector in the employ of Honig, deposited in a bank, withoutthe
latter's knowledge, certain sums of money, and, in designating to
whose order the same was to be payable, wrote in the bank register,
"'N. Honig, by S. A. Peyser." Thereupon the bank issued and de-
livered to Peyser certificates of deposit payable to the order of" N.
Honig," which were afterwards paid by the bank upon the indorse-
I To appear in 49 or 50 Ark. Rep. 5 To appear in 15 or 16 R. I. Rep.
2 To appear in 71 or 72 Cal. Rep. 6 To appear in 82 or 83 Va. Rep.
3 To appear in 7t or 72 Iowa Rep. 7 To appear in 63 or 69 Wis. Rep.
' To appear in 22 or 23 Neb. Rep.
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ment by Peyser of "N. HoNIG, by S. A. PEYsER." Subsequently,
Honig, learning of the transaction, ratified the act of Peyser in de-
positing the money, and sued the bank upon the certificates so paid.
Held, there was no contract, express or implied, that the certificates
were payable only when indorsed according to the signature in the
register; and that Honig was entitled to recover. MCFARLAND and
PA.T RoN, JJ., dissenting: Honig v. Paafyc Bank, 71 or 72 Cal.
CONTRACT.
Measure of Damages for Breach.--The defendant, in an action
for money alleged to be due the plaintiff for printing done for the
defendant, set up a counter-claim for damages resulting from a fail-
ure to have the printing done by the time agreed on. The defend-
ant was a showman, and the printing consisted of pictorial posters,
hand-bills, etc. Held, that the measure of damages, under the
counter-claim, was the difference between what the defendant was
to have paid the plaintiff under the contract and what he had to pay
to effect, as far as was practicable, the same amount of advertising
by the means which he actually used; but that he should not be
allowed any compensation for loss of profits: Great WFesternPrint-
ing Co. v. Tacker, 71 or 72 Iowa.
Rescission of-&Sle-Breach of Conditions-Delivery of Pos-
a331n-Recovery of Purchase-3foney.-D. Co. purchased of P. & J.
a herd of cattle and calves, range, the possessory right of herding
range, and miscellaneous outfit of herding and ranching property,
situated at and known as the "Chadron Creek Ranch," on Chadron
creek, in Sioux county, Nebraska. The purchase price was $76,530,
$50,030 of which was paid down. The remaining sum, $26,530,
was to be paid on or before the twenty-sixth day of June next ensu-
ing the date of purchase, April 7, 1884; also a sum equal to the
running expenses of the herd from December 26, 1883, to the day
of payment. There was a bill of sale expressing the terms of sale
as above, signed by P. & J., and placed in escrow in a bank at
Cheyenne, Wyoming, with the following memoranda: "Placed in
escrow with Morton E. Post & Co., this tenth day of April, 1884,
to be delivered to said Dakota Stock & Grazing Company, Limited,
upon compliance by said company with the terms of the within in-
strument, such compliance to be evidenced by the acknowledgment
in writing thereof by Price & Jenks; otherwise to be returned to
Price & Jenks." About the fourth day of June the agent of D.
Co. informed P. & J. personally, at the city of Chicago, that he was
on his way to Cheyenne and the Chadron Creek ranch for the pur-
pose of closing up said business. On the sixth he wrote them from,
Council Bluffs, Iowa, requesting them to come or send an order to
Chadron creek, whereby on their part the business might be settled
up; and again on the tenth he telegraphed them from Cheyenne to
the same purpose. On the 10th, P. & J. replied by telegraph from
Chicago: "Impossible to make delivery or settlement now. Will
be in Cheyenne prepared, June 26th." In an action by D. Co. to
rescind said contract; and recover back the money paid thereon,
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held, that D. Co. was not in default by reason of its not paying or
tendering the $26,530 due on the contract of purchase, and a sum
equal to the expense of keeping the herd, as provided in the con-
tract, at the bank of Morton E. Post & Co., at Cheyenne; P. & J.
declining to give any assurance that the property at Chadron Creek
ranch would be delivered or the dominion thereof turned over to it
on that day: Dakota Stock and Grazing Co. v. Price, 22 or 23 Neb.
P. & J. were in default in failing and refusing to take the neces-
sary steps to enable them to deliver the possession, control, and do-
minion of the property to D. Co. on the twenty-sixth day of June,
or sooner, in case D. Co. chose to make payment, and "take over"
the property before that date, and in failing to deliver the property
sold on the date last above mentioned: _1d.
Upon the facts and law above stated, D. Co. may rescind the con-
tract of purchase, and recover back the money paid thereon: Id.
CorPoRATIONS.
Actions against-Corpo-ate Namne.-The fact that a corporation
has changed its name, witnout any change in its membership, is no
defence to an action instituted against it under its Jbrmer name:
Jrefley v. Shenandoah Iron, L., .1 & .M Co., 82 or 83 Va.
ELECTIoNs.
Ballots-Mistake in Name of Candidate-Evidence to Explain.-
One E. W. was nominated for the office of township trustee by the
political party to which he belonged; but the ballots, which were
printed by a person who knew that E. IV. was such candidate,
but who supposed that his name was F. W., bore that name instead
of E. IV. After the election had progressed some time, the mistake
was discovered, and it was corrected by writing "E." on the remain-
ing ballots. Both the " E. W." and the "F. W." ballots were cast
by members of E. W.'s party, and those who voted the "F. W."
ballots thought at the time that that was E. W.'s name. There
was no person by the name ofF. IV. in the township eligible to the
office. fHeld, that these facts were admissible in evidence to show
for whom the '"F. W." ballots had been cast, and that they should
be counted for E. W.: Jimmer v. Eaton, 71 or 72 Iowa.
EscRow.
Performance of Conditions-Right to Delivery.-Defendant exe-
cuted to plaintiff his note and mortgage in settlement of a cause of
action against him in her favor. The securities were delivered to a
third party, to be handed by him to plaintiff when she had executed
and delivered to him a good and sufficient release and satisfiaction
of her claim. Held, that this was a delivery in escrow, and that
when plaintiff tendered the release to the third party she was entitled
to the possession of the securities: Schmidt v. Deegan, 68 or 69 Wis.
E XPERT.
Testimony of-Value of Property.-Where a competent witness is
called as an expert to testify as to the value of property, his testi-
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mony is not rendered inadmissible by reason of the fact that he had
not seen the property since about one month prior to the time when
the value was to be established, it being shown by other testimony
that the property was in substantially the same condition at both
periods of time: Connolly v. Miller, 22 or 23 Neb.
Where a witness is called as an expert to testify as to the value
of property in dispute, and it is shown upon examination that he is
competent to so testify, and his testimony is taken, and upon cross-
examination he is asked if his estimate of values is not based on
what he would give for the property, which he answers in the
affirmative, a motion to strike from the record all of the testimony
of the witness was properly overruled. Such answer would not
render the witness incompetent to testify, but, if unexplained, might
diminish the weight of his testimony: Id.
INSURANCE.
Powers of Agen -Estoppel.-Where an insurance agent, clothed
with all apparent authority, received defendants' note for a first
premium, and agreed in writing with them that, if unsatisfactory,
they might reject the policy, and the note would be returned, both
note and agreement constituted the contract between the parties,
and, upon the policy being rejected, the company cannot sue on the
note, and claim that their agent had no authority to make the
written agreement: Jacoway v. German Ins. Co., 49 or 50 Ark.
Fire Insurance-Limitation of Action- Condition of Policy.-In
an action commenced more than six months alter loss, upon a policy
of fire insurance which by its terms, limited the time for the com-
mencement of actions thereunder to six months next succeeding the
day upon which the loss should occur, and gave to the company
sixty days after the receipt of sufficient and satisfactory proof in
which to pay the loss, the defendant pleaded the former condition
in bar, and the plaintiff's demurrer thereto was sustained. Held,
that the condition limiting the time for the commencement of actions
under the policy to a period less than that prescribed by the statute
of limitations is valid, and that the latter provision did not -operate
to extend the time beyond the six months. HrNTON, J., dissenting:
Virginia Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Wells, 82 or 83 Va.
LANDLORD AND TxNANT.
Lease-,Joint Liability for Defective Premises.-The defendant
M. was the owner of a defective wharf, which was used in con-
nection with a place of public resort. He leased both, knowing
the defect, to the defendant B., who was then ignorant of it, but
who continued to use both for public resort after learning about it.
In an action for damages to the plaintiff, who had been injured by
said defect, held that the lessor and lessee were jointly liable: Joyce
v. Martin, 15 or 16 R. I.
